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On the dialectics of global governance in the 21st 
century: a Polanyian double movement? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Social scientists and political economists have used Karl Polanyi’s 
concept ‘double movement’ in trying to make sense of the current 
neoliberal phase of world history. Following decades of intense 
economic globalization and market-oriented reforms across the world, 
Polanyi has been invoked not only to explain what is happening but 
also to give reasons for being hopeful about a different future.1 In the 
flux of world history, nothing is eternal. From Polanyi we know that 
society is bound to protect itself against the market; and it seems 
certain that one change will be followed by a different one. 
 
In The Great Transformation (1957, orig. published 1944), Polanyi 
argued that the Economic Man and self-adjusting markets are neither 
natural nor universal. Rather, they are relatively recent socio-
historical constructs. The rise of (i) the calculative gain-orientation, (ii) 
the modern market economy and (iii) the modern liberal state are 
essentially connected. Prior to the great transformation in modern 
Europe, markets existed as an auxiliary avenue for the exchange of 
goods that were otherwise not obtainable. The market society was 
born out of the changes that emerged first in Britain. 
 
Polanyi wrote The Great Transformation during the Second World War. 
The book opens with the words: “nineteenth century civilization has 
collapsed; this book is concerned with the political and economic 
origins of this event” (ibid., p. 3). Polanyi argued that in the age of 
industrial mass production markets have had detrimental social 
effects. He reasoned that a market society is not sustainable and 
                                                                 
1 The following will be briefly discussed in this paper: Blyth, 2002; Burawoy, 2010; Cox, 1996; 
Dale, 2012; Gill, 2008; Gills, 2008; Helleiner, 1995; Lie, 1991; Maertens, 2008; Meier, 2008; 
Munck, 2007; and Silver & Arrighi , 2003. My aim, however, is to develop the idea of double 
movement further. 
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without a well-functioning economic basis, also the Gold Standard 
and balance of power system were bound to collapse: 
 
[…] the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. 
Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it 
would have physically destroyed man and transformed his 
surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures 
to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the self-
regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus 
endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which 
forced the development of the market system into a definite 
groove and finally disrupted the social organization based upon it. 
(Ibid., pp. 3-4) 
 
This and other similar passages suggest that Polanyi saw the double 
movement (construction of self-regulating market  social self-
protection and decommodification) as inevitable. The self-regulating 
market has social effects that evoke society to protect and reassert 
itself against the commodification of land, labour, social relations and 
many natural things. Assuming that this holds true also in the 21st 
century, we should expect society to rise once again to protect itself 
from the present-day version of the utopia of self-regulating markets.  
 
In an alternative but compatible interpretation, which apparently  
explains also the shift to neoliberalism, maybe what we are 
experiencing is a political pendulum characteristic of the industrial 
civilization: a swing from markets to society leading, in the next 
phase, to a swing from society to markets, and so on, perhaps ad 
infinitum (or perhaps the pendulum will gradually come to a standstill 
as it loses its energy). Without the pendulum-metaphor, however, the 
contemporary countermovement may look more uncertain, since the 
conditions in the early 21st century appear rather different from those 
of the late 19th and first half of the 20th century. 
 
Instead of an empirical regularity or occasional historical connection, 
however, the double movement can also be understood dialectically as 
a description of an irreversible historical development following its 
own inner laws or schemes of development. The best-known 
dialectical scheme is ‘thesis & antithesis  synthesis’. Although Hegel 
and Marx rarely (if ever) used this trichotomy, it has been applied 
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widely, also to thinking about the double movement.2 From this 
perspective, the post-WWII democratic welfare state was, as a 
synthesis, a historical novelty. It re-embedded markets in social 
relations and ethico-political considerations, and decommodified 
aspects of society (e.g. health and education), but in a different way 
from the mediaeval guilds or from the absolutism of the mercantilist 
state. Welfare state developments lasted for a few decades. Relatively 
soon, however, the twin processes of economic globalization and 
neoliberalization started to fashion a new antithesis. During the 
process, the spatial scale has been changing. Arguably, the next 
synthesis must be a globally orchestrated response to the dominance 
of the markets and for the protection of society on a planetary scale. 
 
In the following, I explicate the limits of this tripartite scheme and 
develop it further by drawing on ideas from critical realist 
philosophical dialectics (Bhaskar, 1993; 1994), political theory and 
global political economy. Critical realist dialectics enables 
complicating and enriching the scheme of potential transformations. 
Mere negative critique or anti-thesis, perhaps understood in terms of 
reversing the process of commodification, is not sufficient for 
transformative action. A new synthesis solving the conflict between 
the thesis and antithesis, by uniting their common truth in a new 
way, would be required. Contra some interpretations of Hegel, a 
dialectical synthesis is neither preservative nor fully determined ex 
ante. Something is always lost; and many responses to a given 
contradiction (problem, lack etc) are possible. (Bhaskar, 1993, 320)  
 
While many responses and figures of change are possible, not all of 
them are equally rational or viable. Ethico-political critique 
presupposes the plausible possibility of purposeful changes towards 
better context-dependent practices and institutional arrangements. 
(Sayer, 2000, p. 161)  Agency and concrete utopias are prerequisites 
for any future transformations. Actors need to have an idea what 
possible, desirable and sustainable futures may lie in the 21st 
                                                                 
2 It is often forgotten among Hegelians and Marxians that the central concepts and categories of 
dialectics are metaphorical extensions of dialektikē tekhnē, the ancient Greek art and craft of 
persuasion and argumentation. In the original context, the scheme ‘thesis & antithesis  
synthesis’ made a lot of sense; and it can be a helpful way of thinking about various other 
processes as well. Similarly, in contemporary contexts of dialogue, debates, and processes of 
collective will-formation, involving political struggles, this basic scheme can be used fruitfully for 
the purpose of rationally reconstructing the ways in which arguments are built and actors are 
positioning themselves. See Rescher, 1977; and Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; 2004. The 
tripartite dialectical scheme is applied to the Polanyian double movement e.g. by Cox, 1996. 
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century. As history moves on and contexts change, abstract 
normative claims should rationally assume new directions. 
 
There are also concrete geo-historical reasons why a simple Polanyian 
synthesis, such as democratic welfare state writ global, would not 
work. Even during its heyday, the welfare state was contested, often 
for good emancipatory reasons; and soon it became increasingly 
contradictory due to globalization. The scale, complexity and cultural 
pluralism of the world system as a whole make the global replication 
of the mid-20th century national-territorial solution highly unlikely.  
 
Overcoming the contradictions of the liberal world economy is best 
seen as an evolutionary and path-dependent process of institution-
building. Moreover, in the dialectical development of human 
understandings and social relations, the double movement is but an 
aspect and moment of a wider world-historical process towards 
critical-reflexive planetary ethics and politics. For decades it has been 
realised that contemporary global conditions comprise 
overpopulation, shortage of energy resources, ecological crisis, 
including global warming, and “the enormous enlargement of the 
risks involved in human activities and conflicts” (Apel, 1978, pp. 82-4; 
see also 1991). This multiplies relevant lacks, problems and 
contradictions, and thus also possible rational responses to them. 
 
 
Polanyi’s historical double movement 
 
What Polanyi sets out to explain in The Great Transformation is the 
occurrence of great power peace and war. Polanyi’s method is 
dialectical (in the sense of Rescher, 1977, 1987 and 2006). He starts 
with a puzzle, a contrast between the 19th and mid-20th centuries, 
and moves along complex cycles which criss-cross the same ground 
from different angles in assessing claims, all in view of constructing 
his own explanation of the world-historical situation at hand (the end 
of laissez-faire, the rise of fascism, the Second World War). Thus 
Polanyi first outlines his main contrast and then proposes a far-
reaching hypothesis: it was the 19th century self-regulating market 
system that led to the turmoil of the 20th century.  
 
In order to prove his hypothesis, Polanyi’s next task is to show that 
the real ground (and thus self-understanding) of economic liberalism 
is false. Thus he argued that the 19th century system was an artificial 
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and fairly recent historical construction. This takes him to scrutinise 
the emergence of the Economic Man, by using studies from 
anthropology to economic history.3 By showing that humanity is 
social, not economistic, by nature, he cleared the ground for a 
political economy analysis of the effects of economic liberalism and 
the ethico-political responses they evoked. Given the Hundred Years’ 
Peace of the 19th century, disturbed only a few times by limited wars, 
the Great War and the subsequent turmoil came as a surprise to most 
Europeans. The collapse of the 19th century civilization led to two 
world wars and other catastrophes of the early 20th century. 
 
Polanyi also makes use of another historical contrast. Whereas in the 
18th century power-balancing practices had resulted in endless wars, 
following the great transformation and industrial revolution the 
worldwide context had become different. Given market and financial 
interdependencies of the 19th century industrialising world economy, 
the power-balancing system worked for peace – as long as it could be 
sustained. It was widely concluded that trade and investments 
require peace at least among great powers. “[W]hile business and 
finance were responsible for many colonial wars” (ibid., p. 16), it was 
“by functional determination [that] it fell to haute finance to avert 
general wars” (ibid., p. 13). Apart from the carefully orchestrated 
strings of finance, the 19th century system of peace was also premised 
on stable exchanges (the Gold Standard) and free trade. 
 
These foundations of great power peace within the industrial 
civilization were precarious, however, and not only in their own terms 
but also because of their problematical market underpinnings: “[T]he 
origins of the cataclysm lay in the utopian endeavor of economic 
liberalism to set a self-regulating market system” (ibid., p. 29). Self-
regulating markets were created by the modern nationally centralized 
states in Europe, evolving through the phases of mercantilism and 
18th century economic liberalism. Evolving technologies reinforced 
and speeded up these processes, which then generated the 19th 
century industrial world economy. Productivity growth and other 
                                                                 
3 See also Polanyi’s later works on tribal economies and early civilizations, such as the volume 
edited by Polanyi, Arensberg & Pearson (1957, and esp. ch. XII by Polanyi himself) . Polanyi 
stressed that only a few societies in the universe of all societies have been characterized by 
markets. For a debate about how to up-date Polanyi in the context of currently available data 
about Mesopotamian civilizations, see Renger, 2005; Silver, 2007. The problem with this debate 
lies in the assumption that people in the early civilizations had reflective consciousness, although 
there is ample archaeological evidence that reflective consciousness was only gradually emerging 
at the time; see Jaynes, 2000. 
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economic improvements, characteristically related to sea-born trade 
(i.e. mass production for external markets) and associated economic 
opportunities, came at the high social cost at home including: 
 
 mass-scale human dislocation  
 commodification of human labour 
 unemployment fluctuating with business cycles 
 
These developments are essentially connected. Mass-scale dislocation 
occurred typically through enclosures of common land, a process 
widely experienced as violent and unjust. This process meant in 
practice urbanization, especially after The Poor Relief Act of 1662 was 
partially repealed in 1795, and more fully in 1834 (the 1662 Act 
established the parish to which a person belonged and thereby 
strongly hindered physical mobility). Commodification of human work 
involves the rise of labour markets in industrial cities, where all or 
most of the means of living have to be bought from the market with 
money.4 Employment contract generates power relations within the 
workplace and constitute a new category, unemployment, for those 
who are involuntarily without work and thus income. For the first 
time in human history, self-regulating markets, setting prices 
competitively by adjusting to supply and demand,5 started to 
constitute social relations and determine the distribution of goods, 
employment and income, rather than the other way round.6  
                                                                 
4 In spite of the overall positive Mortality Revolution of the 19th century Britain and other 
countries, urban life expectancy initially dropped quite significantly, especially among the slum 
dwellers and factory workers, due to the lack of hygiene and poor living conditions in the early 
industrial cities. Life expectancy in the cities was far lower than in the surrounding countryside. 
(Szreter & Mooney, 1998) Also the mean height of men declined in this period (Komlos, 1998). 
Thus arguably human degradation in the early industrial period was absolute; but see also note 
7.  
5 Even in Polanyi’s own formulation there is a risk of reading the present into the past (cf. note 6). 
“[The market system] assumes markets in which the supply of goods (including services) available 
at a definite price will equal the demand at that price.” (Polanyi , 1957, p. 68) Theories of value – 
from natural and just prices to the commodity-theory of money and the land- and labour-theories 
of value – are constitutive of economic practices and their governance. Labour theory of value is 
compatible with industrial economy and markets, but the fully-fledged doctrine of price 
mechanism as the meeting of independently operating supply and demand originates in the 
second half of the 19th century. This doctrine rose with value subjectivism, which was adopted 
and developed by neoclassical economists. 
6 Polanyi criticises the Whig interpretation of history (cf. Butterfield, 1950) as linear long-term 
progress towards the 19th century market society. Polanyi’s (ibid., p. 45) criticism still applies to 
neoclassical economics: “[…]the same bias which made Adam Smith's generation view primeval 
man as bent on barter and truck induced their successors to disavow all interest in early man, as 
he was now known not to have indulged in those laudable passions. The tradition of the classical 
economists, who attempted to base the law of the market on the alleged propensities of man in 
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The market makes a multitude of people vulnerable not only to the 
power of the employers but also to sudden economic changes, 
fluctuations and crises. The level of unemployment varies depending 
on the phase of business cycles. During a downward turn a multitude 
of people may find themselves in the most miserable parts of slums 
without any proper means of living or any real standing in the 
community. Business cycles are closely connected to changes in the 
world economy. In the 19th century they were connected especially 
through the Gold Standard. When a nation’s internal prices diverged 
from international price levels, the only legitimate means for that 
country to adjust to the decline of gold reserves was by deflation. This 
meant allowing its economy to contract until declining wages reduced 
consumption enough to restore external balance. This implied 
dramatic declines in wages and farm income, a sharp rise in business 
and bank failures, and increases in unemployment. 
 
In spite of what the 19th century “dismal science” may have indicated, 
the question was not about mere survival, not even for the very 
poorest slum dwellers, but also about human sociability and dignity 
and moral standing. Because the gain seeking Economic Man is a 
socio-historical construction, and “because the commodity description 
of labor, land and money is entirely fictitious” (ibid., p. 72), the effects 
of gain-seeking and self-regulating markets concern our natural 
environment and the moral life of real human beings, and they must 
be, and have been, evaluated as such.7 Polanyi distinguishes between 
constant tendencies towards the pollution of nature and degradation 
                                                                 
the state of nature, was replaced by an abandonment of all interest in the cultures of ‘uncivilized’ 
man as irrelevant to an understanding of the problems of our age.”  
The standard reply by neoclassical economists tends to rely on Milton Friedman’s 
instrumentalism: all assumptions are false anyway; what matters, is whether the theory can 
“predict” (e.g. Rottenberg, 1958). Thus North (1976) maintains that the logic of the Economic Man 
can be expanded (by taking into account side payments etc) to “predict” (i.e. postdict) at least 
some of the principles of earlier societal forms. See also McCloskey (1997) for a cavalier dismissal 
of Polanyi’s account on the basis of an appeal to one authority (Philip Curtain) and a very brief 
discussion of classic Mayan civilization before 800 AD (providing some indirect evidence that 
Mayans understood “production-costs” in terms of distances from the raw material sources). 
7 What really happened to the material standards of living of working people in the early phase of 
industrialisation from the 1790s to mid-1800s or so remains an open question. Accounts vary 
and have changed over time (cf. the optimism of Lindert & Williamson,1983 vs. the pessimism of 
Feinstein, 1998). Polanyi (1957, p. 129) was not concerned only with aspects such as wages or life 
expectancy. Citing Robert Owen, he maintained that poor people’s situation in the first half of the 
19th century was “infinitely more degraded and miserable than [it] was before the introduction of 
those manufactories”. Even though the employed workers might have been somewhat better off 
financially than before, in terms of their social environment, neighbourhood, standing in the 
community and craft (skills), the new situation compared very unfavourably.  
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of human life and development (Marx would have talked about 
“exploitation”), and the periodic cycles in which further and more 
acute destruction may occur. Overall, in the mid-19th century 
 
…[t]he effects on the lives of the people were awful beyond 
description. Indeed, human society would have been annihilated 
but for protective counter-moves which blunted the action of this 
self-destructive mechanism. (Ibid., p. 76) 
 
This is the double movement: the first moves consist of creating the 
market society; the second of counter-moves to protect nature and 
society from the market. For instance, the fictitious commodity of 
labour came to be shielded from the working of the market 
mechanism through protective institutions such as trade unions and 
factory laws, struggling gradually into being from the 1870s onwards.  
 
Towards the turn of the century, suffrage became increasingly 
universal and working class an influential factor in the state. The 
state administrative functions had expanded already with the creation 
of laissez-faire. The clash of the organising principles of economic 
liberalism and social protection intermingled with the conflict of social 
classes via the state. The organising principles were articulated 
through concepts, ideas and theories that also constituted responses 
to various turns of history. The conflicts tended to be aggravated at 
the downturns and crises of the markets, nationally and worldwide. 
 
Polanyi is in fact ambiguous on the role of theories and ideologies in 
constituting social protectionism. Polanyi clearly gives a major role to 
classical political economy and related theories (that among other 
things “discovered society”) in grounding the construction of laissez-
faire market. Yet he also maintains that from the last quarter of the 
19th century onwards the reasons for the self-protection of society 
were so undeniable that all parties – their ideological differences 
notwithstanding – started to favour protection against the market. 
This seems to conflate nationalist and socialist measures; and the 
general logic of market-intervention (that may rely on market-
mechanism) and the more specific logic of decommodification.8 
                                                                 
8 This conflation is understandable given Polanyi’s aim to explain the rise of fascism and national-
socialism. However, as one of the anonymous referees of this paper stated, there is an important 
conceptual difference between the politics of conservative social protection (expressed as 
protectionism), and the politics of de -commodification (which has, at times, been the driving force 
of ‘anti-market’ and later ‘anti-globalization’ or ‘alter-globalization’ political struggle). Polanyi 
(1957, p. 144) lumps together all contra-free-market developments: “When around the 1870s a 
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Transnational industrial production involves long-term investments 
which are risky for investors. “Unless the continuance of production 
was reasonably assured, such a risk was not bearable” (Ibid., p. 75; 
italics HP). These risks were often addressed in military-security 
terms. The dangers of deflation posed by the Gold Standard, and the 
dependence on trade even for the basic means of living, intensified the 
interdependencies and dynamics of the world economy, within which 
struggles over the power and fate of national states took place. This 
dynamics had the potential of escalating conflicts. While the speed of 
economic growth in this period was unprecedented in human history, 
the Hundred Years’ Peace of the 19th century was thus vulnerable to 
the complex and contradictory dynamics of global political economy.9  
 
 
The return to the market: a puzzle to Polanyians  
 
Following thirty years of crises and wars (1914-45), few people 
believed that the 19th century laissez-faire system would have any 
future – except a handful of old-school economic liberals, many of 
whom joined the Mont Pelerin society in the late 1940s. From the 
mid-1930s to the 1970s the world was dominated by various 
nationalist, socialist, and social/democratic movements and 
developments. Orthodox economic liberalism was all but dead.  
 
In the 21st century it is evident, however, that history did not come to 
an end with the second part of Polanyi’s double movement. The “stark 
utopia” of the market has returned, albeit in a new form and in a new 
context. Whereas economic liberals find it difficult to explain the 
early-to-mid-20th century rise of the principle of social protection in 
                                                                 
general protectionist movement – social and national – started in Europe…”. See also the long list 
of various measures and phenomena that Polanyi provides on the same page, including what 
many Marxists would see as manifestations of monopoly capitalism. 
9 For an explanation of the First World War along these political economy lines, see Patomäki 
2008, chs 2 and 3. Following the financial crisis and downturn of the early 1870s, and within the 
overall deflationary institutional and structural context, Britain’s attempt to secure demand for its 
industrial goods, also by protectionist and imperi alist means,  – however half-hearted those 
means might have been in practice – was perceived not only as a model to be followed but 
frequently also as a threat to the vital industrial interests of the new industrial countries. Some 
states responded in kind. The overall context was gradually becoming (also for the initiators of the 
process) more competitive and territorialist, as well as nationalist, imperialist and militarist. These 
developments constituted a process of mutually self-reinforcing securitisation. From the 1890s 
onwards, this process of securitisation led to a process of alliance reformations, then arms race 
and finally the war. The war was not unavoidable, however, and democratization and social 
reforms could have contributed to changes in the  international context already in the 1920s. 
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its various guises,10 the opponents of neoliberalism may find it 
equally difficult to grasp why the world has since the 1970s and 
1980s moved to the opposite direction11. Diverse explanations have 
been proposed to make sense of these geo-historical twists and turns, 
and especially the developments of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. Several of the available explanatory narratives have been 
told in terms of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’.  
 
Some authors invoke Polanyi simply to suggest a historical analogy. 
Thus Stephen Gill (2008, p. 24) uses Polanyian degrees of 
“embeddedness” to classify different “world orders in socio-political 
structures at the national or transnational levels” and then indicates 
a broad historical analogy between the two eras (ibid., pp. 78-9, 146-
7).  
 
Similarly Mark Blyth (2002, p. 4), in his study of economic ideas and 
institutions, argues that “the political struggle between disembedding 
and re-embedding the market continues today, even though its 
contours have shifted”. Blyth follows Polanyi in thinking that the 
ideas behind embedded liberalism were a rational response to a real 
crisis. Yet he appears puzzled by the late 20th century process of dis-
embedding liberalism. Why a return to the market? 
 
                                                                 
10 Polanyi (ibid., p. 148) calls their interpretation as “the legend of antiliberal conspiracy”, 
according to which it is ideological preconceptions or narrow group interests, or “impatience, 
greed, and short-sightedness” (ibid., p. 142), which are to be blamed for the rise of social 
protection at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century. In contrast, after having 
discussed this issue at some length, Polanyi concludes that “everything tends to support the 
assumption that objective reasons of stringent nature forced the  hands of the legislators” (ibid., p. 
148). 
11 Many neoclassical economists maintain that currently prevailing “modern” economic theories 
have been a rational response to the problems of Keynesianism. The critics of neoliberalism 
disagree with this story, of course, but they do not provide a shared single interpretation to 
replace it. The French regulation school equate Keynesianism with the Fordist regime of 
accumulation and neoliberalism with post-Fordism, presupposing the classical Marxist 
base/superstructure distinction (e.g. Amin, 1994; Boyer, 1998; and Tonkiss, 2006: ch 4). David 
Harvey (2005) attributes neoliberalism to an ideological attempt to restore the position of upper 
classes, while Peter Gowan (1999) focusses more on a related to restore the position of Britain & 
US in the world economy. These are at best partial accounts. For instance, what is called ‘post-
Fordism’ is actually a result of a mixture of processes that include the deepening of consumerism 
and product-differentiation (an important explanation of economic concentration); the 
development of new communication and information technologies; transformation of relations of 
power within the workplace in favour of professional management and owners; and the 
application of ideas of neoclassical economics to management first in private and then in public 
organisations. Thus “post-Fordism” is more a result of the hegemony of neoliberalism than its 
explanation.  
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In Blyth’s assessment, the second set of transformations might have 
been less consequential than the first, though this is debatable. What 
is clear is that the 19th century institutions have not been fully 
restored. These qualifications aside, Blyth contends that 
neoliberalism is “simply a warmed-over version of the ideas that 
embedded liberalism had seemingly defeated back in the 1930s” 
(ibid., p. 126). Geo-historical economic and institutional conditions 
may have facilitated the revival of the market utopia, and Blyth makes 
a strong case for thinking that ideas matter, yet the reasons he gives 
for the rise of neoliberalism are far from compelling.  
 
Eppo Maertens (2008, p. 143) points out that we need “to look for an 
ideologically grounded theory to explain the persistent influence of the 
idea of self-regulating markets”. He suggests that Hegel’s theory about 
negotiating freedom and recognition could provide a clue for 
understanding the wide appeal of neoliberalism. The liberal notion of 
freedom, which is closely associated with private property, is deeply 
ingrained and cognitively forceful. The thrust Maertens’ argument is 
that neoliberalism can be ideologically appealing, although ultimately 
it is illusory and cannot provide a genuine experience of freedom. 
 
More concrete in his discussion than Maertens, Brian Meier (2008, p. 
160) observes important differences between the two geo-historical 
eras. In the era of neoliberal globalisation, in spite of formal 
democracy in the core countries, capital seems to be in control of 
states and their policies, whereas mass media exerts powerful sway 
over the minds of citizens. Meier asks whether it “[will] take another 
crisis of such a magnitude as the Great Depression or worse to 
mobilize against the market utopia?” Perhaps it will, but Meier does 
not explain why capital has turned so all-powerful and why media is 
spreading the message of neoliberalism rather than ideas stressing 
the values of the social. Meier’s explanation of the geo-historical turn 
to neoliberalism is unsatisfactory, although he is correct in stressing 
the power of media to propagate ideas and images. 
 
In the absence of a convincing and sufficiently comprehensive 
explanation, should we be content with a simple pendulum model of 
modern history? Perhaps the organising principles of economic 
liberalism and social protection and all the forces behind them 
interact in such a manner as to generate a pendulum? Perhaps each 
swing will take a crisis of some sort? Under the current 
circumstances it may thus be asked whether “the recent global 
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financial crisis heralds a pendulum swing from neoliberalism (or 
‘market fundamentalism’) towards a form of socially coordinated 
capitalism, or towards ‘more of the same’” (Dale, 2012, p. 3; also Gills, 
2008). The pendulum-metaphor would seem to fit broadly with the 
contour of historical facts, indicating that a new swing is possible in 
the future. Is there anything more we need to know? 
 
 
Towards a better explanation of the market-revival 
 
It seems difficult to explain the revival of the market in Polanyian 
terms. Michael Burawoy (2010, p. 307; also Dale 2012, p. 11) points 
out that in the 1940s Polanyi explicitly rejected Marxism. For that 
reason Polanyi downplayed the possible explanatory role of private 
ownership of means of production and the related imperatives for new 
sources of profit and capital accumulation. The democratic welfare 
state regulated workplace practices and corporate behaviour in many 
ways, but did not question profit-seeking and private property per se 
or the autonomy of the owners (or corporate managers as their 
representatives) to make investment and other operational decisions. 
Perhaps herein lies the key to explaining the rise of neoliberalism? 
 
What is more, the post-Second World War model of embedded 
liberalism (democratic welfare state) relied on the institutional 
arrangements of the original Bretton Woods system that lasted from 
1944 to c. 1973. The essence of the embedded liberalism compromise 
of the Bretton Woods system was to devise a framework which would 
safeguard and even aid the quest for domestic stability and 
legitimization, “without, at the same time, triggering the mutually 
destructive external consequences that had plagued the inter-war 
period” (Ruggie, 1982, p. 393). The aim was to avoid imposing 
deflation and trade wars, and to keep the world economy open and 
expanding. Moreover, the Bretton Woods system also represented a 
partial victory of productivism over financial capital: the Bretton 
Woods systems deliberately constrained the freedom of movement of 
financial capital (Gill, 1997, p. 7). The Bretton Woods arrangements 
worked for a while. 
 
Rounds of free trade negotiations ensured the expansion of the world 
economy and increased the openness of national economies. 
Transnational corporations re-emerged in the 1950s and 1960s and 
assumed again the centre stage of the world economy. The evolvement 
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of offshore financial centres, tax havens and Eurodollar markets 
further increased the transnational mobility of capital. Globalization 
in this sense implied new exit options for private, productive capital 
and new room for manoeuvre for financial capital. Less bound by the 
national state, those responsible for investment and other operational 
decisions have been increasingly able to set tacit or explicit conditions 
on state policy (“business confidence”). Power relations have changed. 
 
Assuming with Michał Kalecki that the private owners of means of 
production and managers of corporations are structurally liable to the 
utopia of the market,12 economic globalization would seem to explain 
the transformation of the late 20th and early 21st century. Due to 
globalisation, state strategies based on attracting trade, production 
and finance in terms of ‘business confidence’, or by improving 
capital’s position in the world economy, may work to a degree and for 
a while, and thus be represented as a model to be followed by the 
others. Media too can be privatised and bought, and thus brought 
closer to conveying the utopic message of the market. The ambiguities 
of the Hegelian theme of freedom and recognition can be exploited to 
strengthen the popular attraction of this utopia. 
 
If this picture is basically correct, as Robert Cox (1996, p. 528) among 
others insist, we should expect the next step to be a protective 
response on a global scale. While the first Polanyian double movement 
was instituted through the modern national states, the second must 
be realised largely via emerging systems of regional and global 
governance.13 Looking into the future, Cox is explicit in using the 
language of thesis and antithesis in describing the overall movement: 
 
“…a protective  response at the level of global society has yet to 
take form. Yet the elements of opposition to the socially disruptive 
consequences of globalization are visible. The question remains 
open as to what forms these may take, as to whether and how 
                                                                 
12 Kalecki (1943) famously argued that the business leaders and capitalists tend to wish to create 
circumstances in which policies depend on their confidence; the scope of free markets are 
maximised; and hierarchical power-relations in the workplace are ensured. This they are willing to 
do in spite of the real (but contested) macroeconomic effects of their preferred free-market policies 
(less growth, more unemployment and inequality, and more volatility, turbulence and crises).  
13 The relatively recent rise to prominence of the term “governance” is closely associated with the 
market-oriented theories, stories and blueprints of neoliberalism (e.g. Taylor, 2000), and more 
generally with the prevailing geo-historical formation that Foucault (1991) has labelled as 
“governmentality”. Aware of the risk of reifying neoliberalism, I will rather use other related 
concepts whenever appropriate, such as arrangement, government, organization and rule. 
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they may become more coherent and more powerful, so that 
historical thesis and antithesis may lead to a new synthesis.”  
 
Cox talks about a new synthesis, but does not develop this idea 
further. “People, collectively, may be confronted with an opportunity, 
but whether or not they take it is up to them. Human agency, 
conditioned by past experience, is the ultimate maker of history.” 
(Ibid., p. 533) What is evident from Cox is that global collaboration 
and new forms of global political agency are required. At the same 
time Cox warns about “moral exhortation” and “utopian schemes”. It 
is indicative of his attitude that he emphasizes the progressive aspect 
of the 1990s multilateralism, and discusses briefly debates within the 
UN system. He also mentions that international organizations should 
be made democratic. But are Cox’s remarks enough for 
understanding the conditions and goals of the possible turn away 
from the market and towards new global forms of social embedment? 
 
 
Constructing the double movement: the problem of agency 
 
There is more than a trace of functionalism in Polanyi. The double 
movement is not only supposed to be inevitable but also to occur 
almost semi-automatically. (Cf. Dale, 2010, p. 10, citing Ronaldo 
Munck’s unpublished manuscript) This presumption does not accord 
with the historical record. While the working class movement in 
England and elsewhere emerged from a variety of socio-economic 
conditions, it was actively made by socialists who believed in its 
world-historical role. In other words, whereas trade unions, various 
associations and societies, and labour or socialist parties constituted 
the pivotal transformative agency of the modern world (roughly from 
the 1870s into the 1970s), the agency itself was made by active 
human and social actors. In E.P.Thompson’s (1966, p. 194) well-
known catchphrase: “The working class made itself as much as it was 
made”.  
 
This process of making a class identity was based on shared 
understandings about problems (lacks, contradictions etc); shared 
values (solidarity, collectivism, mutuality, political radicalism and 
Methodism); and a sense of common fate defined in terms of specific 
goals and socialist utopias. Democratic political actors must also 
learn to recognise universal equality, accept political pluralism and 
the legitimacy of different viewpoints, and approve the rule of law. 
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Overlapping traditions and proximity in industrial cities facilitated 
developing common ethico-political ideas and, as their counterparts, 
effective organisations. Working class ideas (and related debates 
around theories of political economy, history etc) became constitutive 
of the identity and interests of trade unions, left political parties etc. 
The process of making a movement in this sense can take decades. 
 
These experiences can be generalized. Any new ethico-political 
‘synthesis’ is dependent on human conceptual and organizational 
work. Moreover, the simple tripartite scheme of dialectical change 
(thesis  antithesis  synthesis) should be demystified and 
pluralised by using further dialectical categories and conceptual 
possibilities. Dialectic itself is not a unitary phenomenon but consists 
of many figures and topics (Bhaskar, 1991, p. 146; Collier, 2002, p. 
157). In abstract, dialectics cannot provide a theory of any particular 
changes. Yet its metaphors, analogies, narratives and schemes can 
yield various insightful hypotheses both for explaining past changes 
and for scenarios about possible and more or less likely future 
changes.  
 
Thus the dialectical notion of unity of opposites can be used critically 
to reveal the inner tensions and complexities of Polanyi’s basic 
categories, the market and the social.  It has been pointed out that 
Polanyi’s concept of the market is highly idealised and abstract, in 
effect neoclassical (Lie, 1991). It is thereby stripped-down of the 
necessary social underpinnings of real markets, such as 
communication, cultural meanings, trust, knowledge, competences, 
relations of power and institutional structures. This makes it difficult 
to explain how real capitalist markets function (for instance 
marketing leading, via cultural meanings, to product differentiation 
that co-generates degrees of monopoly and barriers of entry). It also 
hides different possible ways of organising markets (for instance, 
workers’ cooperatives or democratising finance for new enterprises). 
 
Because of Polanyi’s highly idealised and abstract concept of the 
market, he is then misled to lump together all forms of “social 
protection”, even when the protection may serve the purposes of, say, 
large landowners’ specific interests or militarist nationalism. The 
drastic curtailing of the market may also coincide with an assault 
upon the rules, customs and institutions that protect labour rights, 
as in Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. Against Polanyi, it is also true 
that an enlightened capitalist may realise that healthy, highly skilled 
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and motivated workers are better for production than miserable slum-
dwellers with barely any substantial know-how or skills (in the OECD 
world, the latter have been largely replaced by machinery). In other 
words, there is no singular ‘thesis  anti-thesis  synthesis’ 
movement. Rather reality involves complex multi-path developmental 
processes that can be interwoven or contradictory in various ways. 
 
There are many possible outcomes of the dialectic of thesis and 
antithesis: a simple refutation of a relevant proposition; a 
combination of the opposing assertions; a synthesis by making a 
general claim, preserving the insights of both thesis and antithesis; or 
a qualitative improvement of the dialogue by means conceptual 
complexification and innovation, perhaps taking the dialogue to a new 
path or level. Many dialectical moves are un-anticipatable. 
 
Similarly one can argue (i) that there are many possible rational 
directions of world history, some of which can be at least in some 
regards un-anticipatable, and (ii) that these directions are also a 
matter of dialectical disputations, always occurring under concrete 
world-historical circumstances. This is what the openness of world 
history means. Any claim about rational tendential directionality of 
world history has to be understood as a normative dialectical 
argument within the meaningful human sphere of the cosmos. 
 
It is thus clear that the new double movement will not come about 
semi-automatically, but can only be realised through transformative 
praxis. The rational tendential directionality of world history is 
contingent upon a transformative praxis, a process which is in turn 
dependent upon the rationality of participating individual actors 
(Bhaskar, 1993, p. 91). Rationality cannot be confined to any 
particular agents or collective category. The minimal meaning of 
rationality is openness to reasons and learning. Once context-specific 
learning has taken place and a reasonable direction been set, the next 
logical step is the process of constructing transformative agency, in a 
manner analogical to the making of the working class in the 19th and 
early 20th century. But is there anything analogical in the 21st 
century? 
 
A lot has been said about the new social movements, NGOs and 
global civil society. Among others, Ronaldo Munck (2007) discusses 
the anti-globalisation movement and various local transnationalisms 
and transnational political actors as possible carriers of the Polanyian 
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second movement in the global age. The problem is that most of these 
actors tend to be re-active rather than proactive, responding to the 
latest round of neoliberal initiatives by trying to mobilise resistance 
against them. When these civic actors are pro-active (pushing for e.g. 
a global financial tax or debt alleviation), they try to shape the public 
opinion via mass media, lobby law-makers within national states and 
influence negotiators in international organizations. In a few 
occasions, this pro-active road has been successful, but usually only 
after a long delay and in rather exceptional circumstances.  
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and advocacy groups and 
networks have limited agendas and legitimacy. They need the support 
of states to initiate any changes. Since 2001, the World Social Forum 
(WSF) has been forging links and ties of solidarity among diverse 
actors. Although the WSF may seem a party of opinion when defined 
negatively against neoliberal globalisation, imperialism, and violence, 
it remains a rather incoherent collection of diverse actors with no 
common direction; and the WSF itself is usually defined as an open 
space, lacking agency. At best the WSF is based on minimally shared 
understanding about the problems (lacks, contradictions). It is 
divided over whether the aim is to defend local or national autonomy 
or build new regional or global institutions, and there are many 
disagreements over specific proposals as well.  
 
The question of transformative global agency concerns rationality and 
developments that may take decades. It cannot be settled on the basis 
of available empirical evidence in the mid-2010s. The making of a 
collective agency is a process of active and reflexive engagement 
within the world in which we seek to achieve the unity of theory and 
practice in practice (Bhaskar, 1993, pp. 8, 158-61). Therefore, if the 
argument is that new global institutions and powers are needed and 
that they have to be democratic, theory/practice consistency requires 
that the transformative praxis itself has to be capable of collective 
will-formation and democratic decision-making. Transformative praxis 
has to be also processual, developmental and directional, involving 
political programmes specifying aims and concrete utopias. Its 
organizational forms must be compatible with these requirements.  
 
The transformative praxis itself can be transformed on the basis of 
past experiences and criticism of them. There is a quest for new forms 
of agency such as a world political party. A democratic organisation 
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must capable of learning from the past setbacks.14 Political parties 
have tended to become elitist, if not outright hierarchical. A global 
political party would have to recognise, on the one hand, the limited 
practical possibilities of many to become transnational activists, 
whether members of the party or not. Therefore, the party should 
work systematically to widen the social basis of activists and dedicate 
a substantial part of its resources for this purpose. It would also have 
to be committed to the re-organisation of institutions of mass media 
and systems of education for the purpose of encouraging public 
virtues and making citizens well-informed (cf. Patomäki, forthcoming).  
 
The main purpose of the world political party – or global Polanyian 
movement more generally – would be to transform existing global 
institutions and to create new ones, in order to overcome the 
structural power of transnational capital and various contradictions 
of global political economy. By democratising globalisation, the 
movement would enable processes of decommodification and new 
‘syntheses’ concerning the market/social nexus.  
 
 
Overcoming contradictions in global political economy 
 
The world economy has existed for a long while. For Polanyi (1957, p. 
89), “the old world was swept away in one indomitable surge toward a 
planetary economy” in the early 19th century. Yet in his mid-20th 
century book Polanyi failed to consider alternative ways of organising 
and shaping what he called “the new and tremendous hazards of 
planetary interdependence” (ibid., p. 181). This was a major lacuna of 
his work. In the first half of the 21st century, planetary 
interdependence is the key to understanding action-conditions. 
 
Common institutions are best seen as rational responses to various 
problems, lacks and contradictions. Often especially contradictions 
trigger change. What is a contradiction? Incompatibility at the most 
                                                                 
14 In Patomäki (2011) I ask: how would it be possible to combine (1) the capacity to establish an 
overall, binding direction to the activities of the party with (2) a democratic process of will -
formation that also maximises its learning capacity? In an Arendtian or republican manner, a 
global political party could combine a self-selected core of cosmopolitical activists with a wide 
basis of more passive supporters. However, unlike Arendt, the  party should not fail to theorise the 
social conditions and structures co-determining the self-selection of those who care and are 
willing to take the initiative. For the party, ‘the obvious inability and conspicuous lack of interest 
of large parts of the population in political matters as such’ would not be a given condition but 
something that can e, at least in part, changed. 
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general level means that something cannot be and be not in the same 
respect and at the same time. Also actions may be contradictory if 
they can and are likely to defeat they own purpose. Contradictions in 
this sense can arise from incorrect beliefs about how things work (e.g. 
if one mistakes poisonous substance for medicine) or from the lack of 
generalizability (e.g. if everyone wants simultaneously to avoid losing 
money by withdrawing all their savings from a bank that is 
considered shaky). The latter is a case of fallacy of composition, which 
can lead through a self-fulfilling prophecy to a bank run.   
 
Finally, contradictions can occur also at the level of social systems, if 
there are organizing principles that work against each other, or if an 
organizing principle generates a force that either tends to produce or 
is itself the product of conditions which simultaneously or 
subsequently produce a countervailing force (Bhaskar, 1991b, p. 
110).  Real world contradictions are not categorical because whether 
the contradicting forces cancel each other out – or whether one force 
in the end annuls the other – depends on contingent circumstances 
(e.g. false beliefs: how much poison one takes; bank runs: how many 
individuals are in fact withdrawing their savings simultaneously). 
 
There are diverse contradictions in global political economy. They 
depend on real geo-historical interdependencies and processes: what 
actors believe and how they behave, how markets are organised, and 
what kinds of collective institutions are available. Consider a few 
characteristic examples of contradictions in the early 21st century 
global political economy. A Keynesian welfare-state can be 
contradictory in an open and liberal world economy simply because 
corporations can move their tax base elsewhere if they consider the 
level of taxation to be too high. This depends of course also on what 
factors other than taxation determine investment decisions.  
 
Current account deficits and surpluses cancel out – their total sum is 
always zero – and in that sense it is impossible for all the states to be 
on surplus simultaneously. The degree to which states prioritise 
current account surplus varies, however, and some of them can find 
deficit acceptable, at least for a while. The real causal effects of this 
incompatibility depend thus on complex circumstances.  
 
Many states are committed to improving their current account 
balance by enhancing their “competitiveness”. The problem is that 
attempts to increase cost competitiveness through internal 
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devaluation tend to prove contradictory. Imagine a simplified world of 
only two countries. Both try to enhance their competitiveness by 
putting down wage-level or taxes and social benefits. As a result, 
neither country emerges as more cost-competitive than before, but 
due to deflation in both countries, they face smaller export markets.  
 
There will be less efficient demand in the system as a whole, thus a 
weaker basis also for economic growth (or worse, there will be a 
recession or even depression in both countries). The characteristically 
dire social consequences of this kind of policy turn out to be 
counterproductive also from the viewpoint of its own publicly 
expressed rationale, namely GDP growth. In the world economy of 
almost 200 states – all much wealthier and populous than in the 19th 
century, and many with in-built automatic stabilisers and inclination 
to resort to Keynesian measures in downturns despite the prevailing 
neoliberal prescriptions – the policy of competitiveness generates a 
deflationary tendency. This tendency is partially analogical to that of 
the Gold Standard, although generating effects less strictly. 
 
Even when state actors’ awareness develop and they stop seeing the 
social context in mere parametric terms (as an ‘external thing-like 
environment’), and when they become aware of the strategic 
interactions and game-like situations between individual actors 
(Elster, 1978, p. 159), they may still reify theirs and others’ interests 
and options. For instance, governments may recognize that economic 
globalisation is a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where states compete in 
attracting investors by means of neoliberal reforms, which may be 
seen as less than fully desirable because of their negative effects on 
democracy, social justice and security, well-being, and indeed on 
economic growth. However, because of the reifications of interests and 
strategic options, the individual state-actors still do not know how to 
resolve the contradiction between individual and collective rationality 
– and this reification and incapability may also be a co-result of other 
interests playing a role in the communication and learning processes. 
 
Political economy contradictions can be resolved by means of 
collective actions and by building more adequate common institutions 
(Patomäki, 2013, pp. 164-93). For instance, it is possible to build a 
mechanism by means of which world trade surpluses and deficits are 
automatically balanced through tax-and-transfer (based on Keynes’ 
International Clearing Union, the Brandt Commission proposals, and 
other more recent proposals). These kinds of institutions can be 
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characterised as global Keynesian, framing questions of public 
economic policy and politics reflexively on the world economic scale. 
Global Keynesianism aims to regulate global interdependencies in 
such a way as to produce stable and high levels of growth, 
employment, and welfare for everyone and everywhere, 
simultaneously. This requires new common institutions. 
 
New common institutions will evolve in an evolutionary fashion by 
replacing aspects of authority of territorial sovereign states with more 
adequate (social, Keynesian, democratic etc) global arrangements and 
organizations; in other words by overcoming definite lacks, absences, 
problems and contradictions step by step, institutional reform by 
reform. There is no reason to think about these kinds of reforms and 
evolutionary changes as piecemeal and always separate, however. 
From a dialectical perspective, processes are seen in relations of 
mutual dependency (Ollman, 2003, pp. 18-19, 157-8). Different 
processes are often connected and interwoven through 
internal/conceptual relations; but they do interact causally, too.  
 
A series of feasible and compatible political economy reforms can be 
put together and forged into a strategy of democratic global Keynesian 
transformations.15 Accumulation of relatively small (”quantitative”) 
changes in specific areas may lead to ruptures and sudden 
transformations (“qualitative changes”) in others, as issues and 
processes are linked. After a critical point, changes towards a 
particular direction can become mutually (self-)reinforcing, and this 
may also be their deliberate purpose. As a result one world-historical 
developmental path comes to be replaced by another.  
 
 
Collective learning towards holoreflexivity 
 
                                                                 
15 Strategies must be reflexively context-specific. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, and at the 
time of the rise of the World Social Forum, I argued with Tei vo Teivainen that by tackling 
important aspects of the power of finance and by creating democratic forums and new public 
sources of finance, the world political context can change. Most importantly, by relieving the 
effects of debt and short-term finance on the policies of states, the debt arbitration mechanism 
and CTT would make a number of states also more autonomous in the WTO negotiations. Also, 
for instance, UN reforms will become more likely once new sources of funding the UN system have 
been institutionalised. (Patomäki & Teivainen, 2004) All these reforms are still needed, and it is 
still true that partial reforms will in this way create new opportunities for further transformations, 
but by mid-2010s the world-political context has changed, not least in terms of potential 
transformative agency. I will return to this point in the conclusion. 
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Like Cox and many others, Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk (2009, 
ch 5) propose that the colonisation of society by market forces is now 
proceeding on a truly planetary scale. Camilleri and Falk try to find 
empirical evidence of an emerging Polanyian trend for global social 
protection. The problem is that they do not look beyond the current 
empirical patterns. They avoid discussing the rational and normative 
basis for transformative agency. With great difficulty, Camilleri and 
Falk depict a few positive trends: the internet and global civil society 
indicate emergent forms of agency. Disappointed, they see more 
reasons to be hopeful in the field of environmental protection.  
 
Camilleri and Falk are right, however, in arguing that contradictions 
are not confined to political economy. From a dialectical perspective, 
learning to absent various lacks and to overcome contradictions is at 
the heart of all human geo-historical developments. Human 
developments at one moment tend to result in new lacks and 
contradictions in the next geo-historical moment. Further learning, 
conceptual work and collective actions may or may not take place. If 
this does take place, new levels of human consciousness make new 
social practices and institutions possible. This holds true also for the 
contemporary industrial world, the growth of which has resulted in 
manifold unintended consequences, potentially counterproductive to 
the sustainability of planetary systems of life. Ethics and politics are 
increasingly concerned with the future of life. (Apel, 1992, p. 224) 
 
Camilleri’s and Falk’s (2009) concept of holoreflexivity is a remarkable 
attempt at contributing to the making of a global transformative 
agency. The Greek term holo means ‘whole’. Holoreflexity, Camilleri 
and Falk envisage, is the next logical step in the mutually reinforcing 
processes of increasing organizational complexity and personal and 
institutional reflexivity under planetary conditions. Reflexivity denotes 
the capacity to reflect upon the conditions of one’s being, agency and 
actions, also in view of shaping those conditions. Thus holoreflexivity 
involves a comprehension of the mechanisms, structures and 
processes of the whole. As a form of understanding, “it is global in 
that it encompasses all social groupings, communities cultures and 
civilisations, and planetary in that it comprises the totality of 
relationships between the human species and the rest of the 
biosphere” (Ibid., p. 537).  
 
Global warming, overpopulation, pathogens, shortage of resources, 
weapons of mass destruction and so on are often understood as risks 
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that require global responses (Beck, 1999). Many of these problems 
can also be conceptualised as self-generated contradictions, and 
especially in terms of counterfinality. For instance, resistant 
pathogens can result from the widespread use of anti-biotics and 
global warming from industrial growth. As the number of risks, 
problems and contradictions multiplies, so does also possible rational 
responses to them, constituting reasons for holoreflexivity. Material 
conditions are pushing moral learning. 
 
Arguably, holoreflexivity (or something equivalent, such as Apel’s 
planetary macroethics) is a condition for the rise of global movements 
promoting more functional and legitimate common institutions. This 
raises a further question: is it possible to deliberately facilitate 
collective learning towards holoreflexivity? The task becomes twofold: 
(i) to enable maximal moral learning among the world-population by 
and large; and (ii) to create adequate global institutions to ensure and 
facilitate planetary co-operation, to overcome contradictions and to 
resolve social conflicts. These are two aspects of the same task.  
 
The mechanisms and processes of collective learning can be 
illuminated by means of an evolutionary model of social change 
(adopted, with modifications, from Harré, 1979, pp. 355-83). 
Mutations (M) are rules, practices and institutions. Selection 
conditions (S) are formed by the context of action of the actor who 
innovates, adopts or supports the adoption of Mi. The design of 
common institutions should thus aim at creating a social context in 
which the S-conditions are supportive of maximally wide and as high-
level ethico-political learning as possible. This kind of a context would 
also be predisposed towards new innovations (M-conditions), which, if 
established, will become part of the new S-context. A virtuous circle 
may emerge. 
 
Moreover, as different processes are connected and interwoven, the 
Polanyian double movement and attempts to respond to global 
environmental and other problems can be linked in many ways. For 
instance, it may be that global warming requires global Keynesian 
responses, such as a democratically organised global greenhouse gas 
tax and world public investments, rather than a cap-and-trade 
system premised on the market. Breakthrough in any one area of 
governance can become a model to be followed in others. In a world 
where processes are in relations of mutual dependency, collective 
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learning towards holoreflexivity, and new institutional innovations, 
may well contribute to the end of the dominance of the market-utopia.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
We are inhabitants of a world of multiple processes and tendencies. 
As Bhaskar (1993, p. 261) argues, this world is characterized “by 
complex, plural, contradictory, differentiated, disjoint but also 
coalescing and condensing development and antagonistic 
struggles”. World history is not a smooth, linear development to any 
direction, however rational that direction may be. As processes are 
subject to regression, entropy and roll-back, we cannot expect real 
geo-historical processes to be anything but a messy affair. 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that because 
developments are not smooth and linear, and because many 
developments seem regressive or chaotic, there is no rational 
tendential direction to world history. My argument suggests rational 
tendencies towards global Keynesian and other holoreflexive systems 
of governance, enabling processes of decommodification and new 
‘syntheses’ across the planet concerning the market/social nexus. 
 
The rational tendential directionality of world history is contingent 
upon a transformative praxis. If and when the transformation 
becomes self-reinforcing, learning will occur across the political 
spectrum and different organizations. A global political party – or 
parties – may nonetheless prove crucially important in this medium 
term future transformation. Once at least some democratic global 
Keynesian and holoreflexive institutions are in place, democratic 
political parties will be essential for their legitimate operation. 
Simultaneously, local, national and transnational political 
possibilities are being expanded by constructing adequate worldwide 
institutions to regulate, tax and shape transnational capital. Thus 
ethico-political aspirations to move beyond the limitations of the past 
welfare state models – these aspirations were vocal already in the 
1960s and 1970s, prior to the rise of neoliberalism16 – can be met by 
                                                                 
16 For instance, in Sweden in the 1960s and early 1970s, processes of ethico-political learning and 
unlearning; responses to various glocal problems and skirmishes; and the ideals of the socialist 
emancipatory project; led in many places to aspirations to move beyond that model. This 
happened at the time when the intrinsic and extrinsic conditions of social-democratic power-
mobilisation were already rapidly changing (Patomäki, 2000, pp. 125-8; Ryner, 2002). 
25 
 
reforming the social and ethico-political underpinnings of the market. 
The point of global reforms is also to increase autonomy and new 
possibilities. 
 
Emergence is real. At any given time it is possible that new powers, 
structures and mechanisms emerge and existing ones disappear. 
Democratic global Keynesianism is only a provisional end-point, 
subject to contestations and debates about its merits. It will generate 
lacks, problems and contradictions of its own and will be followed by 
other possibilities. World history is an on-going, unfinished and 
unbounded process that can only be anticipated to a point. 
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